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Purpose – This paper investigates the effects that the framing of contractual performance 
incentives has on supplier behavioural and relational responses and on the buyer-supplier 
relationship.   
 
Design/ methodology/ approach – We conducted three in-depth case studies of contractual 
relationships, which exhibit differences in terms of how performance incentives are framed i.e. 
using promotion, prevention, and ‘hybrid’ frames respectively. The study involved 38 semi-
structured interviews and content analysis of contract agreements.  
 
Findings – First, while promotion-framed incentives lead to positive supplier responses and 
improved relationships, prevention-framed incentives result in negative responses and 
deteriorating relations. Second, hybrid-framed incentives can lead to productive supplier 
responses when positive ex-ante expectations are met, although the creation of such positive 
expectations in the first place depends on the proportionality of bonus and penalty elements. 
Third, promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives do not by default lead to positive effects, as 
these are contingent on factors pertaining to contractual clarity. Fourth, the overarching purpose 
of the contract moderates the effects of contract framing on supplier responses.   
 
Research limitations/ implications – The study contributes to contracting research by showing 
how the framing of performance incentives influences supplier behavioural and relational 
responses. It also extends existing literature on contract framing by examining the effects of 
hybrid-framed incentives, and stressing that contract framing should be considered in joint with 
the clarity and overall purpose of the contract to elicit desired supplier behaviours.  
 
Practical implications – Managers of buying firms may differentiate their approach to contract 
framing depending on the type of supplier relationship in focus. Furthermore, effective design 
of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives requires attention to: a) realistic performance 
targets (on the short, medium and long term); b) salient bonuses related to these targets; c) 
incentive structures that appropriately balance rewards and risks; and: d) mechanisms that 
explicate and consider uncontrollable factors in the calculation of bonus /malus payments.   
 
Originality/ value – The paper extends the literature stressing the psychological impact of 
contracts on buyer-supplier relationships by highlighting that contractual clarity and the 
overarching purpose of the contract moderate the effects of contract framing on supplier 
behavioural and relational responses. 
 
Article classification: Research paper 
 








Formal contracts play a key role in the governance of buyer-supplier relationships, often 
complementing relational mechanisms (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014; Wacker et al., 2016). A key 
characteristic of contracts is the structure of incentives offered to suppliers, which refers to 
fixed or variable payment tied to efforts or results (Hypko et al., 2010). Performance incentives 
involve financially compensating a supplier for agreed-upon outcomes (also referred to as 
performance-based pay or pay-for-performance (Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Selviaridis and 
Spring, 2018)), and are typical in performance-based contracting (PBC) (Sumo et al., 2016; 
Datta and Roy, 2011).  
Generally, performance incentives are considered to elicit supplier behaviours that are 
productive; i.e., behaviours that have positive effects; e.g. promoting performance 
improvement, cost efficiency and innovation (Randall et al., 2011; Sumo et al., 2016). 
However, unproductive behaviours, i.e., behaviours having negative effects, resulting from 
perverse incentives, such as supplier opportunism, may also be at play (Koning and Heinrich, 
2013). Overall, the effectiveness of contractual performance incentives, that is, the extent to 
which they trigger supplier responses that have positive effects, largely depends on how these 
are designed and executed (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015; Essig et al., 2016).   
One important contract design issue is the way in which provisions are framed (Cao and 
Lumineau, 2015; Schepker et al., 2014). In the specific context of inter-firm contracting, 
framing refers to the way contractual provisions are articulated. For example, contractual 
incentives can be designed using a ‘promotion’ or gain frame that awards suppliers a bonus in 
case performance targets are met or even exceeded; or a ‘prevention’ or loss frame, which 
imposes a penalty in case performance targets are not met (Weber and Mayer, 2011). Promotion 
frames are suggested to instigate flexibility, creative behaviour and buyer-supplier 
collaboration to achieve the specified exchange goals (Weber and Mayer, 2011), while 
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prevention frames are suggested to induce vigilant behaviour and arm’s length relations. The 
work underlying these notions is however mostly conceptual in nature; empirical evidence on 
the impact of contract framing on buyer-supplier relationships remains very limited (Weber, 
2017). In particular, the extant (performance-based) contracting literature has underplayed the 
role of framing and the supplier responses it triggers.  
This paper therefore empirically examines the effects of framing contractual performance 
incentives on supplier behaviour; more specifically, the supplier’s responses regarding the 
exchange and the ongoing buyer-supplier relationship. The study investigates the 
(un)productive supplier responses that emerge under contracts that exhibit differences in terms 
of how performance incentives are framed. The fieldwork comprises three cases of buyer-
supplier contractual relationships: one using a promotion frame, one using a prevention frame, 
and one using a ‘hybrid’ frame (i.e., including both bonus- and penalty-based incentives).  
The study contributes to contracting research by showing how differently framed 
performance incentives affect suppliers’ responses and buyer-supplier relations. It does so by  
drawing on theories from cognitive and social psychology stressing the psychological impact 
of contracts (Weber and Mayer, 2011; Schepker et al., 2014). In addition, the study extends the 
limited empirical literature on contract framing effects (e.g., Weber et al., 2011) by: a) 
examining the effects of hybrid-framed incentives on supplier expectations and subsequent 
responses, b) demonstrating that promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives do not by default 
lead to productive supplier responses, and uncovering several moderating factors pertaining to 
contractual clarity, and c) showing that the framing of provisions should be considered in joint 
with the clarity and overarching purpose of the contract so as to elicit appropriate supplier 
responses. The paper offers managerial insights regarding a strategic approach to contract 
framing considering different types of supplier relationships. It also highlights factors 
influencing the effective design of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives.  
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we present and discuss our 
analytical framework which is informed by Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1998, 1997) 
and Expectation Violation Theory (Bettencourt et al., 1997; Burgoon, 1993). Following Weber 
and Mayer (2011), we adopt these perspectives to analyse the effects of different types of 
contract frames on the focal exchange and the underlying relationship. We then explain our 
research design, after which we analyse our cases and discuss the cross-case findings. We 
conclude by drawing out theoretical and managerial implications, limitations, and future 
research avenues.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
Recent contracting research demonstrates a shift in attention from contract structure as a 
safeguard to economic risk, to contract functionality and its effects on coordination and 
adaptation (Schepker et al., 2014). It suggests that contractual provisions of various natures 
may have different effects on the specific exchange and the ongoing buyer-supplier relationship 
(Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Schepker et al., 2014). Mayer and Argyres (2004), for example, 
found that while the use of enforcement clauses does not necessarily damage the development 
of buyer-supplier relationships, the alignment of expectations is not necessarily benign. 
Vanneste and Puranam (2010), in a similar vein, argue that provisions that serve as coordination 
mechanisms do not invoke distrust, while provisions that fulfil the safeguarding function may 
inhibit the development of trust. Weber et  al. (2011) found that a shorter-term contract with an 
extendibility option appears to be perceived as a positive incentive and more effective in 
managing exchange relationships than a longer-term contract with an early termination clause. 
Schilke and Lumineau (2017) find that control and coordination functions of contracts, which 
are suggested with different contractual frames, have a distinct impact on the relationship. 
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Underlying these differing effects is that contracts do not only impact an exchange 
economically, but also psychologically (Weber and Mayer, 2011).  
Such a psychological impact is underplayed in the generic contracting and the more 
specific PBC literatures, regardless of the theoretical perspective (Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) (Williamson, 1985), relational contracting (MacNeil, 1980), Agency Theory (AT) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989))  adopted1. Explicating the role of framing in contract design is important as 
it helps us to understand why certain relationship outcomes are achieved (Weber, 2017).  
To address the psychological impact of contracts, we draw on Regulatory Focus Theory 
(RFT) (Higgins, 1998) and Expectation Violation Theory (EVT) (Burgoon, 1993) to explain 
why different contract frames affect the exchange and the buyer-supplier relationship 
differently. In short, RFT suggests that contractual provisions can be framed either as a loss or 
as a gain (Higgins, 1998; Roney et al., 1995; Tykocinski et al., 1994) and that each of these 
frames will be interpreted differently by the contracted party. These interpretations lead to very 
different expectations for exchange outcomes and the relationship between the exchange 
partners (Weber and Mayer, 2011), thereby inducing certain supplier responses. EVT 
(Bettencourt et al., 1997; Jussim et al., 1987; Jackson et al., 1993; Kernaham et al., 2000; 
Burgoon, 1993) subsequently suggests that meeting or violating expectations set by contractual 
frame during contract execution further affects the exchange and the ongoing relationship 
(Weber and Mayer, 2011). In other words, what happens during the exchange and in the 
ongoing relationship will either be in line with initial anticipations as elicited by the contract 
frame, or not.  
RFT and EVT inform our analytical framework (see Table 1) which comprise the 
following constructs: 1) framing of contractual performance incentives i.e., promotion versus 
                                                          
1 Although none of these conventional contracting theories explicitly addresses the notion of framing, 
this is often implicitly present. We return to this point in the discussion section. 
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prevention frame (derived from RFT); 2) the ex-ante expectations regarding the exchange and 
the relationship set by different types of frames (derived from RFT); 3) supplier behavioural 
and relational responses triggered (derived from RFT); and 4) meeting or violating the 
expectations set by the type of contractual framing (derived from EVT). In what follows we 
elaborate on these constructs. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
 
Under a prevention frame, contractual performance incentives are framed as a loss and 
parties interpret a performance target as a minimum that must be achieved. Performance 
incentives take the form of negative motivation, i.e., the use of penalties in case performance 
targets are not achieved. RFT suggests that the supplier wishes to avoid not meeting the targets 
and incurring the penalty, and therefore responds by displaying vigilant behaviour during the 
exchange, aimed solely at meeting the minimum performance. With regard to the relationship, 
a prevention frame leads the supplier to emphasise negative aspects of the relationship, which 
triggers the relational response to keep the counterpart at arm’s length (Cao and Lumineau, 
2015). RFT also suggests that the prevention contract sets, overall, negative ex-ante 
expectations. These are based on anticipations for impersonal behaviours during the exchange 
and transactional relationships focusing mostly on the letter of the contract.  
In contrast, under a promotion frame, parties view a performance target as a maximum 
that may be achieved (Weber and Mayer, 2011). Performance incentives take the form of 
positive motivation, i.e., receiving a bonus in case performance targets are achieved or 
exceeded. The supplier will actively seek to achieve the objectives, and hence, according to 
RFT, responses during the exchange will involve the creativity and flexibility needed to achieve 
an aspirational objective (Weber et al., 2011). Moreover, at the relationship level, a promotion 
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frame draws more attention to positive relationship aspects, leading the supplier to emphasise 
cooperation and inducing responses aimed at the development of close, personal, and trusting 
relationships (Schepker et al., 2014). Ex-ante expectations set by a promotion frame are, 
overall, positive. That is, they include positive exchange behaviours that go beyond the letter 
of the contract, and close, nurturing and interactive relationships, as suggested by RFT. 
EVT specifically focuses on whether ex-ante expectations that are set by the contract 
frame are met or violated during contract execution. Under a prevention frame, meeting ex-ante 
expectations for impersonal behaviours and transactional relationships will reinforce the 
business-like character of the exchange, while violating such expectations will trigger high 
partner satisfaction and closer relationships. Under a promotion frame, meeting ex-ante 
expectations for behaviours that go beyond the letter of the contract and close, nurturing 
relationships will reinforce the positive, close and cooperative relationship that exists. Violating 
such expectations, however, will undermine the relationship, leading to partner dissatisfaction 
and possibly termination of the contractual relationship.  
The research design is explained in detail next. 
 
3. Research method  
Empirical evidence regarding the impact of framing of contracts (and specifically performance 
incentives) on suppliers’ behavioural and relational responses is limited to date. A case-based 
research design allows developing an in-depth understanding of contract framing effects and 
elaborating existing theory (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014) on the role of framing in buyer-supplier 
contractual relationships by: a) identifying context-specific framing objects (e.g. performance 
indicators and targets, and incentive structures) and, b) stressing factors moderating the effects 
of  promotion (e.g. realism of performance targets and salience of bonus payments), or ‘hybrid’ 
frames (e.g. proportionality of bonus /malus). Another argument for doing case-based research 
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is that case studies are particularly useful for collecting detailed data on formal contracts 
(Lumineau et al., 2011). Indeed, access to copies of key contractual documents (e.g. service 
level agreements and payment mechanisms) proved a crucial source of evidence for 
understanding how performance incentives were framed, and provided details of the payment 
structure and associated gain-share and penalty-based schemes.  
Our empirical study entails a multiple-case research design (Yin, 2009) involving three 
in-depth case studies of contractual relationships in the context of logistics outsourcing (see 
Table 2). The logistics industry is considered an appropriate example context given the 
increasing adoption of pay-for-performance incentives and the challenges associated with 
designing effective performance incentive systems that elicit productive supplier responses i.e., 
behaviours in line with buying firms’ interests (e.g., Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015). The three 
cases were selected using theoretically motivated (Dubois and Araujo, 2007) purposive 
sampling (Patton, 1990): while the payment mechanism in Case A defined a bonus for 
performance achievement, the contract in Case B stipulated penalties for non-performance. The 
contract in Case C catered for both bonus and penalty payments. Hence, the three cases were 
expected to be associated with differing supplier behavioural and relational responses. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
Data were collected through 38 semi-structured interviews with managers of supplier 
companies, and analysis of 43 organisational documents, including copies of the contracts. The 
interviewees spanned multiple functional disciplines including Business Development (BD), 
Key Account Management (KAM), Operations and Legal. Although supplier companies and 
the views of their managers were in focus, Case C also entails interviews with the Logistics and 
Supply managers of the buyer firm with the purpose of clarifying specific aspects of the agreed 
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balanced scorecard that these managers initially designed. Appendix A provides further details 
on the interviewees across the three cases.  
The semi-structured interviews had an average duration of approximately an hour, and 
covered multiple themes including the formation and evolution of the buyer-supplier 
relationships, the exchange goals, the rationale for introducing performance incentives, the 
details of designing and framing them, and the supplier behavioural and relational responses 
they instigated. The interviews helped to elicit information regarding supplier expectations as 
set by the contractual frame, whether these expectations were met, and any associated emotional 
reactions (e.g. frustration or a sense of unfairness). The inclusion of open-ended questions 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) allowed also capturing additional emerging themes such as the 
role of contractual clarity e.g. regarding KPI definition and attributability of performance 
results. Appendix B presents the interview guide. 
The interviewee accounts were complemented and triangulated by accessing and 
analysing key documents (Marshall and Rossman, 1999) including formal agreements, 
contractual payment mechanisms and performance evaluation records. Analysis of these 
documents and specifically of the relevant contractual provisions (e.g., performance- and 
payment-related clauses) provided clear indications for how they were framed, i.e., in 
promotion or prevention terms (Weber and Mayer, 2011). Excerpts from the formal contracts 
were also referred to during the interviews and discussed with managers to seek clarifications, 
and to capture their views on the designed performance incentives, their effectiveness, and any 
related challenges. 
The quality of the case studies was assessed by applying specific criteria and measures to 
address internal validity, construct validity, external validity and reliability issues (Yin, 2009). 
Table 3 shows how each criterion was met following recommendations provided by Gibbert et 
al. (2008) and Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007).  
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Insert Table 3 about here. 
 
Data coding and analysis was conducted manually and much in parallel with data 
collection following recommendations by Barratt et al. (2011) and Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Data coding initially focused on our key constructs, but additional themes and codes emerged 
from the interviews, e.g., regarding the realism of performance targets and the proportionality 
of bonus and penalty payments. Open codes (e.g. ‘bonus payment’, ‘gain-share’, and ‘penalty 
payment’) were initially assigned to interview transcripts and document sections, and these 
were later grouped into higher categories (e.g. ‘promotion-framed incentives’, ‘prevention-
framed incentives’) using axial coding procedures (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Overall, data 
analysis was an iterative process with codes being refined by moving back and forth between 
data, the analytical framework and the cross-case analysis (Ragin, 1992). 
 
4. Findings  
This section presents the findings of the within-case analyses. Case A and Case B involved a 
promotion and a prevention frame respectively, and clear differences were found in terms of 
supplier responses and relationship dynamics. The contractual incentives in Case C were 
framed both in promotion and prevention terms, which, nonetheless, triggered predominantly 
positive supplier behavioural and relational responses. The key findings per case are 
summarised in Table 4. Whenever relevant, we highlight in the following additional important 
aspects particularly with respect to the buying firms’ view of the supplier relationships in focus, 
suppliers’ contractual relationships with customers other than the buying firms in focus, and 
any differing perceptions within and /or between the buying and supplying firms. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
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4.1 Case A: promotion-framed performance incentives 
Supplier A’s payment is linked to product availability and supply chain cost reduction targets 
in the form of a gain-share mechanism. The agreed ‘fixed-price-plus-incentive-fee’ payment 
mechanism (Table 2) is promotion-oriented since the incentive fee is framed as a financial 
bonus, and there are no financial penalties connected to performance targets. This is also 
confirmed by the studied records of buyer-supplier meetings referring to “[a] bonus system in 
relation to operational performance and cost”. Earlier versions of the contract had also stressed 
the joint intention to establish a gain-share mechanism: “The Parties agree to continue their 
discussions regarding a gain sharing model as a means to incentivize actions for cost reduction 
by the sharing of achieved savings over an agreed period of time” (excerpt from the contract 
payment clause). The parties deemed this necessary in order to (re)align their incentives given 
that Buyer A’s shifting emphasis towards cost efficiency had meant that the ‘cost-plus-
management-fee’ included in the previous version of the contract payment clause would have 
created an incentive conflict, i.e. the supplier would be losing revenue while reducing supply 
chain costs.  
The agreed form of the incentive fee resulted from a negotiation process aimed at tackling 
two issues on which Buyer A and Supplier A initially had differing views. First, whether to link 
the incentive fee directly to cost reduction targets, or to volume increase outcomes as a surrogate 
metric of supply chain efficiency. The latter option was based on the assumption that supply 
chain efficiency would reduce product prices at stores and thus lead to increased sales and 
logistics volumes. In the end, parties agreed to link the incentive fee directly to cost reduction 
targets. Second, whether the incentive fee would also include a penalty for under-performance. 
Buyer A initially proposed the inclusion of both a penalty and a bonus payment, which Supplier 
A rejected on the ground that it was too risky since there were far too many uncontrollable 
factors influencing the achievement of cost saving targets e.g.: “From our point of view 
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penalties are excluded” (Supplier A’s BD Manager). Crucially, Supplier A interviewees 
stressed that the inclusion of penalties would have created a ‘finger-pointing’ culture and 
harmed the relationship, as the supplier would be trying to defend itself for any performance 
failures attributable to the customer or third parties. Subsequently, the parties agreed to a bonus-
only incentive, which was linked to minimum product availability targets.  
Ex-ante expectations. The resulting bonus-based incentives (Table 2) set positive 
supplier expectations particularly regarding the alignment of interests with the buyer and a 
collaborative effort to improve cost efficiency and service performance. Specifically, the agreed 
gain-share scheme helped to establish a joint aspirational vision and goal towards increased 
supply chain efficiency and, through that, further business growth. From Buyer A’s perspective, 
the creation of this joint aspiration was important as they were single-sourcing logistics services 
and they were seeing the supplier as a strategic partner that they needed to align with. Supplier 
A interviewees stressed their positive expectations regarding the gain-share arrangement: “We 
need to align our goals and expectations and what we would like to achieve and then it’s about 
acting as one team with one focus! And then it’s about win-win-win...if you are able to drive 
cost out of the system then you are able to get the benefit for the consumers and then you have 
gained a competitive advantage...people buy more products and then we are getting more 
money or more volumes to distribute the fixed cost” (Supplier A’s Managing Director). 
Overall, there was a common view of such expectations at Supplier A despite certain BD 
managers’ concerns regarding the feasibility of bonus achievement (see below). Supplier A 
interviewees converged to the suggestion that the cost efficiency goal would create a virtuous 
circle. As Supplier A’s Operations Director exemplified: “[…] if this product costs 10 euro to 
get from a wholesaler and we move it to our supply chain and it costs 8 euro, then of course 
it’s the same product, it’s just more efficient to do it in our way, then of course they [Buyer A] 
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can lower their landed price to their customers […] And if they bring the price down, they sell 
more! That’s the mentality”. 
Supplier responses. The bonus /gain-share incited Supplier A to direct its attention to the 
supply chain efficiency goal of Buyer A. As such, it contributed to (re)alignment of the 
counterparts’ incentives and helped to reinforce their collaborative relationship. 
Regarding behavioural responses specifically, the supplier emphasised cooperation. 
Supplier A’s BD Manager suggested that “the version [of the payment mechanism] we have 
now emphasises changes to make right decisions and make improvements […], up front 
planning and joint effort to determine what should be taken into account to achieve the set cost 
saving target”. The promotion frame also enabled a flexible framework of cooperation. Indeed, 
Supplier A managers emphasised the need for flexibility to work towards the common goal and 
be prepared to adapt the contractual incentives if these were not helpful. As Supplier A’s 
Managing Director put it: “[…] let’s do that for three months and then what we expect is 
this...and if this goes to the wrong direction and we make more money, that’s not what we want 
and we can correct that! I mean it should be based on transparency and trust...this is what we 
want to have as a margin, at least as basis, and then let’s test this model and then we can revert, 
because then you can build trust, and we see things happening in the right direction”.  
Regarding Supplier A’s relational responses, the gain-share mechanism instigated a 
collaborative working atmosphere based on trust and the two organisations worked closely to 
identify opportunities for supply chain efficiencies without compromising service levels. 
Crucially enough, this also entailed Buyer A’s active involvement and cooperation, since 
efficiency of logistics operations required changes in the way stores behaved and operated e.g.: 
“We will need their [Buyer A] support, absolutely, because we can’t impact much without their 
changes […] if we don’t change the ways the stores order or reduce frequencies of deliveries 
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[…] there cannot be the savings they are looking for without a change of methodology, a change 
of thinking” (Supplier A’s Operations Director). 
Meeting/ violating expectations. The promotion frame initially set positive expectations 
for buyer-supplier collaboration, and these were, on the whole, met and led to supplier 
responses that were in line with Buyer A’s interests. However, Supplier A interviewees also 
expressed their worries and reservations about the cost savings split and the intensity of 
performance targets which the bonus scheme was going to be linked to. Supplier A managers 
pointed out that the contract did not accurately reflect Buyer A’s expectations regarding 
performance goals since the cost reduction target was to be revised and agreed annually (against 
the previous year’s baseline). This created supplier concerns regarding the sustainability of 
performance improvements and the intensity of performance targets. As one of Supplier A’s 
BD Managers explained at the time: It depends how [the buyer] sets it; if they say any savings 
will be shared 80/20, then we always have an incentive to save. If they say you have to reach 
target 97 and then you get 5 million, then if we are uncomfortable in saving 97 we should do 
other things”. Indeed, the agreed contract stipulates that the incentive fee is paid out only if the 
supplier achieves 90% of the annual target, and only if product availability performance does 
not drop below 83% of the annual target. Supplier A interviewees stressed the importance of 
securing a ’fixed fee’ element that would enable financial viability of the business irrespective 
of the potential bonus payment: “They [Buyer A] have the mentality that we need to reach 
almost 100% to get a bonus or nothing, which I think is OK depending on the target and how 
achievable it is. If they are not achievable, then the bonus will be something that we won’t 
budget for” (Supplier A’s BD Manager). The above suggest that Supplier A’s exact responses 
were somewhat influenced by the detailed design of the bonus scheme, even though the positive 




4.2 Case B: prevention-framed performance incentives  
The contract in Case B does not include a bonus for achieving or exceeding the specified 
performance targets. Rather, it stipulates standard penalties for Supplier B non-performance in 
terms of delayed deliveries and product damage or loss (Table 2). The contractual incentives in 
this case were clearly framed in prevention terms as the agreement referred to financial penalties 
only. This was also confirmed by Supplier B’s Global KAM who stated that “we have some 
penalty clauses where we are responsible for direct loss of transport failures, but not indirect 
effects [of such failures]”. In-depth study of the relevant contractual provisions revealed that 
they were framed in terms of losses Supplier B would incur in the event of service failures. The 
‘non-performance clause’ of the agreement stipulated that: “The Supplier agrees to compensate 
[Buyer B] Ex Gratia, for non-performance of a defined part of the Assignment, the same falling 
outside [Buyer B’s] General Conditions for Services, mandatory laws, rules, conventions and 
regulations, applicable on this Service Agreement. The compensation in accordance with this 
Clause is limited to one (1) Basic Amount per incident or in total ten (10) [units] per year”.  
Ex-ante expectations. The prevention frame made Supplier B expect a non-collaborative 
relationship atmosphere and close monitoring by Buyer B. Such expectations were shared 
across all Supplier B interviewees who, more broadly, converged in their reluctance to accept 
penalty-based incentives especially when these had not been accompanied by bonus payments 
e.g.: “If we do it [introduce penalties], then there needs to be bonus for performance and I think 
that the customer doesn’t like that” (Supplier B’s Internal Control Manager). Notwithstanding 
that, the interviews also revealed differing views on the use of performance incentives more 
generally – while managers from BD and KAM functions were emphasising more the potential 
rewards to be had, interviewees from other functions (e.g. Operations, Finance and Legal) were 
more mindful of the associated financial risks.      
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The generic reluctance to accept penalties for non-performance without the corresponding 
rewards for performance achievement was reflected in the way Supplier B contracted with some 
of its other customers: analysis of two additional customer contracts that, interestingly enough, 
were written following Supplier B’s contract template, suggests that penalties (as well as 
bonuses) were excluded. As several Supplier B interviewees explained, this was because 
penalties were perceived as financially risky, a perception that was exacerbated by the typical 
resistance of customers to bonus-based incentives as these translated into increased customer 
costs (which are not acceptable in the highly competitive market for logistics services). 
Nonetheless, in the contractual relationship with Buyer B, who had high bargaining power, 
Supplier B had no option but to accept penalties.  
From a Buyer B’s perspective, the relationship with Supplier B was seen as transactional 
in nature. This was reflected in the contract, which put emphasis on safeguarding against 
potential supplier opportunism (via the stipulated penalties) and offered no incentives for 
service performance improvement or innovation. The relevant contractual provisions also 
stressed the need for cost transparency and competitive service prices as evidenced, for 
instance, in the ‘supplier compensation’ contract clause: “The Supplier agrees to present the 
cost for the Service in a Cost Split Model in order for [Buyer B] to understand the cost structure 
with the purpose to drive total cost from the system”. Supplier B interviewees perceived these 
provisions as setting a minimal goal and signalling that Buyer B was “[…] chasing cost a lot. 
And now they are searching for competitive prices in the market” (Supplier B’s Internal Control 
Manager). 
 The following excerpt from the ‘contractual specification for packaging services’ 
(appendix to the master agreement) also attests to Buyer B’s vigilant attitude and emphasis on 
controlling Supplier B’s behaviour: “It is understood by the Supplier that time has been an 
essential precondition on which [Buyer B] has entered into this Agreement and it is, thus, of 
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utmost importance that the Supplier manages to meet the KPIs and carry out the delivery 
services and other related services timely. The Supplier shall be liable for that the Packaging 
are loaded, stowed, secured and anchored in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations 
and other governmental rules and in such way that no loss or damage to the Packaging, person, 
property or environment will arise during transportation or at unloading”.  
Supplier responses. The emphasis on close monitoring of Supplier B’s behaviour and on 
the penalties for non-performance demotivated Supplier B from initiating service 
improvements.  
Supplier B managers suggested that this was a missed opportunity, and that it was creating 
a competitive relationship atmosphere. They openly expressed their disappointment about 
Buyer B’s over-emphasis on cost, which prevented Supplier B to focus on continuous 
improvement and customer value. Supplier B’s Global KAM complained, for example: “they 
want cost-based pricing to benchmark us to our competitors. But they shouldn’t be comparing 
apples with pears as they do most of the times […] What about the rest of the service we provide; 
this is not for free! So we have different mind sets, we come from a service background and 
they come from direct material, they want to work through benchmarks to get confident in 
contract negotiations to ensure they do a good purchasing job”.   
Regarding behavioural responses in particular, Supplier B adopted a vigilant attitude and 
was largely pre-occupied with mitigating its financial risk and losses in connection to the 
penalties clause. This was done by negotiating firm limits to the penalties and financial 
liabilities associated with performance failures. Supplier B demanded that performance-related 
penalties referred only to direct damages to Buyer B, and did not cover any indirect losses that 
Buyer B incurred as a result of failed deliveries or lost/damaged cargo. This was firmly 
expressed by Supplier B’s Legal Counsel who exemplified: “[…] if there is a delay the only 
liability for the carrier is to pay compensation of the original freight value, not indirect or 
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consequential damages […] so if we are delayed in the delivery of machines to the Gothenburg 
factory, then we just pay compensation for the original freight transport”.  
In terms of relational responses, Supplier B interviewees perceived Buyer B’s focus on 
cost transparency and competitive prices, as reflected in the contract, as harming the 
relationship. As Supplier B’s Global KAM admitted at the time, “we need to revitalise the 
business relationship because we understand that it is not healthy right now”. Several Supplier 
B interviewees confirmed that the exchange relationship had a transactional focus and stressed 
the buyer’s lack of trust towards them. Supplier B’s Internal Control Manager explained that 
“the main challenge is to offer them [Buyer B] transparency. Because they want an open-book 
philosophy and we haven’t been good at offering that. So there are issues around trust and 
whether the prices we quote them are the correct ones, [Buyer B’s] people wonder”.  
Meeting /violating expectations. These behavioural and relational responses reinforced 
the safeguarding attitude from both sides and confirmed the negative expectations that the 
prevention-framed contract set initially.  Buyer B’s goal to control costs and prices was also in 
direct contradiction with Supplier B’s strategic intent on implementing value-based selling and 
contracting with its customers. As Supplier B’s Vice President of Global BD explained, “I 
always want us to make as much money as possible and that’s why we move away from cost-
based pricing by explaining to our customers the value proposition we bring to their business, 
and by that charging a higher price”.  
The negative Supplier B responses prompted by the prevention-oriented frame eventually 
led to the termination of the contractual relationship in 2014. Although Buyer B initiated the 
contract termination process based on Supplier B’s failure to meet its requirements (particularly 
regarding cost transparency), the main underlying reason for contract termination appeared to 
be Supplier B’s frustration with Buyer B’s emphasis on minimal, non-aspirational goals. By 
way of contrast, Supplier B interviewees pointed at the contractual relationship with another 
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customer where a gain-share for logistics efficiency improvements was discussed:“[…] on the 
basis of 50-50 split of cost savings we file for, on the basis that we jointly look for such savings. 
So we have a jointly defined speaking partner from the customer side, so rather than just being 
us looking internally, they need to meet us halfway” (Supplier B’s BD General Manager, 
Outbound). In that case, the promotion-oriented frame appears to have triggered a positive 
supplier response, which has contributed to incentive alignment and a collaborative 
relationship, as also suggested by the BD manager above: I’d say that they [Buyer X] are one 
of our best customers […] and they want us to take cost out of their system”. 
 
4.3 Case C: ‘hybrid’-framed performance incentives 
Supplier C’s payment is linked to performance through a bonus and malus scheme, and a 
separate gain-share for cost savings resulting from supplier-led service innovations (Table 2). 
The contractual incentives were therefore designed using a ‘hybrid’ frame including both 
elements of promotion (bonus and gain-share) and prevention (penalty). The relevant clause 
included in the contractual service level agreement (SLA) stipulated that: “In connection to the 
services provided the supplier shall follow up and report mutually agreed KPIs in a balanced 
scorecard […]. The supplier target is linked to an incentive model and the fees paid by the 
client will be dependent on the results of the balanced scorecard”. This scorecard essentially 
translated KPI results into a scaled score ranging between 1 and 5, with the latter being the 
maximum (i.e., highest performance). The balanced scorecard was linked both to bonus and 
penalty payments (Table 2). For instance, a performance score of 5 would entail a Supplier C 
bonus of 3% of the annual service fees, whereas a score of 2 would entail a penalty of 0.5% of 
the annual fees. In addition, the SLA specified a gain-share model whereby Supplier C is 
required to “proactively initiate new solutions which enable logistics costs reduction” (excerpt 
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from the contractual SLA document). The gain-share depended on the percentage of cost 
savings achieved against Buyer C’s annual target (Table 2).  
Ex-ante expectations. The ‘hybrid’ frame set expectations for collaboration, proactivity 
and creativity and Supplier C-led innovation, reflecting an emphasis on a joint aspirational 
(‘may-be-achieved’) goal to continuously improve service delivery. From Buyer C’s 
perspective, Supplier C was considered a logistics partner whom Buyer C needed to collaborate 
closely with to introduce service process innovations that would help increase efficiency. More 
broadly, Buyer C’s structured approach to segmenting its logistics service suppliers (‘strategic’; 
‘preferred’; and ‘others’) had implications for contract design, in the sense that the inclusion of 
gain-share for innovation-driven cost savings applied only to strategic suppliers. As Buyer C’s 
Global Supply Manager put it, “we are so interlinked and we don’t treat them like a supplier, 
but like a partner. With other suppliers we don’t have that [gain-share]”.  
The aspired service innovations could also be transferred to Supplier C’s other customers, 
and hence, Supplier C interviewees viewed the realisation of innovation as an objective with 
potential benefits beyond the immediate ones specified in the gain-share clause. The balanced 
scorecard, which the bonus and malus provision was tied to, also created a framework for 
regular performance monitoring. Specifically, this provision reflected the need for Supplier C 
to improve service performance and meet freight cost reduction targets set by Buyer C, to be 
able to stay competitive against other potential suppliers. This ‘must-be-met’ goal 
complemented the aspirational objective of proactive improvement.  
Despite the ‘hybrid’ framing (promotion and prevention elements), there was a common 
view and perception across all Supplier C interviewees that the contractual incentive provisions 
were, overall, articulated in terms of gain. According to the supplier’s Global Key Account 
Manager (KAM) for instance, “[Buyer C] needed us to support them with cost efficiency and 
we needed a tool, so that was the SLA with the penalty and bonus scheme and we would have 
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something to gain as well. We have been working with KPIs for many years, but we never had 
those linked to payment”.    
Supplier responses. Because of the greater emphasis on rewarding proactive performance 
and innovation compared to penalising under-performance (see Table 2), Supplier C’s 
managers perceived the introduced performance incentives in a positive light.  
Regarding behavioural responses, the bonus and gain-share mechanisms instigated 
Supplier C creativity and proactivity and helped in aligning Supplier C’s goals and incentives 
with those of Buyer C.  Especially in relation to the gain-share mechanism for innovation-
related cost savings, Supplier C clearly put increased effort in proactively identifying potential 
service process innovations and establishing internally structured processes for creating and 
documenting innovative ideas. As Supplier C’s Global KAM stressed, “This [the SLA] has 
helped to change our mentality and to think in terms of performance improvement. And it also 
offers the opportunity to have a dialogue with the customer and other parties in the supply 
chain to understand what is needed to achieve the targets”.  
In terms of relational responses, the emphasis put on the bonus and gain-share provisions 
appears to have strengthened the buyer-supplier collaboration towards the achievement of the 
jointly defined aspirational goal for ongoing service improvement. As Buyer C’s Global Supply 
Manager confirmed, “It [SLA] has been an absolutely positive experience and we got their 
[Supplier C’s] attention, we are seeing a change in their mind set and it is quite nice to see that 
they are focusing on hitting the targets, generating ideas for improvement”.  
 Meeting /violating expectations. Supplier C’s motivation to proactively improve service 
delivery and innovate confirmed the initial positive expectations that the hybrid-framed 
incentives set, which were overall met. However, there were certain incidents where the 
implementation of the contractual incentives led to temporary violation of Supplier C’s 
expectations. In addition, these incidents also revealed somewhat differing views between 
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Supplier C and Buyer C with respect to: a) how Supplier C’s innovative ideas would be 
recognised and credited, and b) what customer inputs were required to co-produce the agreed 
service outcomes. These aspects were evident particularly when Supplier C was asked to pay a 
financial penalty for under-performance at the end of the first year these incentives had been in 
force. Supplier C interviewees vented their frustration at the time because the decisions and 
actions of Buyer C had an impact on performance e.g. in terms of carbon emissions reduction 
and on-time deliveries. For example, Supplier C’s Air and Outsourcing Manager complained 
that “[Buyer C] needs to place the bookings earlier, to plan this and that, to provide us with 
the packing lists and all the correct information […] they [Buyer C] have problems to get the 
instructions from their customers, they are pushing them to get the information in good time so 
that we can plan the transports”. Such Buyer C responsibilities were not explicitly specified in 
the balanced scorecard and the related contractual incentives. In a similar vein, Supplier C 
interviewees expressed their disappointment about the lack of a clear mechanism for attributing 
innovative ideas to Supplier C. This meant that in many instances Buyer C had claimed 
ownership of innovations and related cost savings. These events appeared to have temporarily 
violated Supplier C’s positive expectations and caused some harm to the relationship.  
These Supplier C concerns and complaints were addressed as Buyer C acknowledged that 
under-performance in some KPIs (e.g. carbon emissions target and deliveries accuracy) was 
due to factors beyond Supplier C’s control. Buyer C, as a result, decided to relieve the supplier 
from the penalty payment, as explained by Buyer C’s Outbound Logistics Manager: “So we 
didn’t want to get the penalty since the savings were far higher than expected […] and 
performance in this respect [carbon emissions] was affected by decisions of market companies 
[end customers] regarding air freight use”. Buyer C’s reaction constituted a positive violation 
of Supplier C’s expectation to pay the stipulated penalty and helped to strengthen collaborative 
efforts to achieve the set goals. As Supplier C’s Global KAM confirmed, “[…] it was really a 
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suggestion by [Buyer C] that we didn’t have to pay the penalty. The collaborative relationship 
mattered more, and it was also the first year of implementing [the performance incentives]”.  
These hurdles and the associated lessons learned triggered a process of renegotiation to 
refine and adjust the ‘hybrid’ incentives in terms of: a) adjusting the definition of some KPIs 
(e.g. “logistics cost reduction” and “deliveries accuracy”) and their weights, b) explicating all 
Buyer C actions influencing carbon emissions and excluding those from the calculation of the 
incentive fee, and c) agreeing on a process for documenting Supplier C’s innovations resulting 
in cost savings. These contract adjustments reinstated the collaborative atmosphere and 
contributed to improved alignment of buyer and supplier goals, as also suggested by Buyer C’s 
Outbound Logistics Manager: “It’s been positive and it’s been a learning process for both 
sides. And we can improve it further, the KPIs can be improved, it’s not the highest level but 
the mind-set is there now. And for me the most important and positive thing is to see that they 
are asking to increase the weight of the KPI connected to innovative ideas”.   
 
5. Discussion  
Cross-case findings suggest that promotion-framed incentives lead to productive behavioural 
and relational supplier responses and improve relationships as initial positive expectations (e.g. 
for collaboration) are overall met, while prevention-framed incentives result in unproductive 
supplier responses and deteriorating relationships as initial negative expectations (e.g. for an 
adversarial working atmosphere) are also met. While this provides a confirmation of Weber and 
Mayer’s (2011) conceptual analysis, our study extends that by highlighting several emergent 
findings on the effects of  hybrid-framed incentives and of contract framing more broadly.  
Firstly, hybrid-framed incentives can lead to productive supplier responses and improve 
relations when positive ex-ante expectations are met. When such positive expectations are not 
met (e.g. in specific incidents), further interactive work is required to refine contractual 
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provisions to re-instate alignment and perceived fairness in the spirit of continuing a valued 
relationship. Secondly, whether hybrid-framed incentives set positive expectations (or not) in 
the first place depends on their detailed design, particularly in terms of the proportionality 
(relative salience) of bonuses versus penalties. This highlights the importance of appropriately 
balancing risks and rewards (Hypko et al., 2010) so that the supplier perceives the designed 
incentives as positive and fair. Fairness pertains not only to actual cash flows but also to 
emphasis being put by the buyer on rewards for performance achievement (see weighting of 
bonus/malus scheme in Case C), which signals to the supplier how the contract is to be 
perceived and sets supplier expectations accordingly. Thus, the proportionality of penalties vis-
à-vis bonuses (Sols et al., 2007; Selviaridis and Spring, 2018) needs to be considered when 
promotion- and prevention-framed incentives are used in combination. Overall, we propose: 
P1: The positive effect of hybrid-framed incentives on supplier expectations is moderated 
by the proportionality (relative salience) of penalties and bonus payments. 
Thirdly, exact supplier behavioural and relational responses to promotion- and hybrid-
framed incentives are contingent on several factors pertaining to contractual clarity. These 
include the following: a) clearly defined inputs of the buyer and third parties into service 
delivery, b) clearly defined uncontrollable factors affecting performance, c) ability to clearly 
attribute performance results to specific actors or factors, d) clarity regarding the evolution of 
performance targets, and e) feasibility /realism of performance targets. In other words, 
promotion-framed, as well as hybrid-framed incentives that set positive expectations, do not by 
default lead to productive supplier responses as suggested in the literature (e.g., Cao and 
Lumineau, 2015). Case A (promotion frame) illustrates Supplier A’s concerns regarding 
uncertainty of cost reduction targets in subsequent years, while Case C (hybrid frame) illustrates 
how lack of clarity regarding definition of KPIs and performance attribution led to supplier 
frustration and temporarily threatened the relationship. In such situations, suppliers may be less 
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motivated to work hard, not least because it is less likely that any bonus would do justice to 
their efforts (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015).   
What seems to be necessary to trigger productive supplier responses is contractual clarity 
to mitigate uncertainty and establish an exchange framework that is perceived as fair (Schilke 
and Lumineau, 2017). The consequences of contracts do not only strongly depend on the 
adopted frame, but also on the interpretation of the contract design and management aspects 
highlighted above. We therefore propose: 
P2: The positive effect of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives on supplier responses 
is moderated by contractual clarity regarding responsibilities and inputs of buyer and third 
parties, uncontrollable factors influencing performance, attributability of performance, and 
feasibility and evolution of performance targets.  
Fourthly, differential contract frames (Schepker et al., 2014) can be used strategically by 
buying firms depending on the type of supplier relationship in focus. Specifically, prevention-
framed incentives can be more appropriate for supplier relationships perceived as transactional, 
while promotion- or hybrid-framed incentives can be used in collaborative supplier relations. 
For example, a penalty-scheme such as the one in focus in Case B does not particularly lend 
itself for relationship improvement. For this reason, the fact that the relationship did not 
improve (in fact it deteriorated) should be no surprise. In contrast, the gain-share scheme that 
features in Case A aided to establishing joint objectives, which Buyer A considered important 
having opted for single sourcing and thereby making Supplier A its strategic partner. As such, 
the gain-share scheme facilitated not only the realisation of joint objectives, but also the 
establishment of a closely collaborative relationship. In the same vein, a prevention-framed is 
not necessarily a counter-productive choice in cases of transactional relations with less 
important suppliers.  
These observations suggest that the overarching purpose of the contract has implications 
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for which frame is most suitable; i.e., the one that enables the achievement of this overarching 
purpose. Hence, we propose: 
P3: The effects of contract framing on supplier responses are moderated by the 
overarching purpose of the contract: prevention-framed incentives can be more effective to 
control suppliers and mitigate opportunism in transactional supplier relations, while 
promotion- or hybrid-framed incentives can be more effective to drive collaboration and win-
win outcomes in strategic supplier relations. 
The above findings suggest that beyond the impact of contract framing (Weber and 
Mayer, 2011), the clarity and overarching purpose of the contract also play a role in influencing 
supplier behavioural and relational responses. All three elements appear to interact, and it is 
this interplay that determines the effectiveness of the exchange and the buyer-supplier 
relationship more broadly2.  
 
5.1 Theoretical and managerial implications 
Our study presents two important theoretical implications: one regarding the notion of 
framing as an element of contracting, and one regarding the theoretical lenses typically used to 
study contracting. On the notion of framing, our study contributes to the limited body of 
empirical research on contract framing effects (Weber et al., 2011; Weber, 2017) in multiple 
ways. Crucially, our study examines the effects of hybrid-framed incentives on supplier 
expectations and subsequent behavioural and relational responses and uncovers the conditions 
upon which combinations of bonus- and penalty-based incentives can be interpreted as 
predominantly positive by suppliers, an issue that has remained unexplored hitherto (Weber, 
2017). The study also provides a nuanced understanding of the framing of performance 
incentives and related challenges e.g., regarding proportionality of bonuses and penalties. In 
                                                          
2 We are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point. 
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particular, it demonstrates that contract framing requires thorough consideration, as promotion- 
and hybrid-framed provisions do not by default have positive effects the extant literature 
suggests (e.g., Schepker et al., 2014). Our empirical research uncovered several moderating 
factors that collectively stress the importance of contractual clarity (see P2).  
Finally, our study extends the existing literature by showing that contract framing, and 
the clarity and the overarching purpose of the contract should be considered jointly when 
seeking to elicit specific supplier responses. The vigilant behaviour triggered by a prevention-
frame may be harmful when applied in contracts with strategic suppliers, but it may be harmless 
and even effective when adopted for transactional relationships. Alternatively, eliciting 
creativity by means of promotion-framed incentives may not be effective in these arm’s length 
supplier relationships. As such, the notion of framing warrants analysis both at the level of 
specific contractual provisions and at the level of the overarching contract purpose.  
Regarding theoretical lenses adopted in the study of contracting, we suggest that RFT and 
EVT help to extend our theoretical understanding of contract design and its effects in that it 
stresses the critical role of framing and the management of expectations that different frames 
set. Neither TCE nor AT explicitly acknowledge nor address the psychological impact of 
contracts and the role of framing more specifically. Many TCE-informed contracting studies 
implicitly assume such a prevention frame (see a.o. the work on take-or-pay provisions by 
DeCanio and Frech, 1993; Hubbard and Weiner, 1986; Masten and Crocker, 1985). Both AT’s 
behaviour-based and outcome-based contracts seem to focus on avoiding unproductive supplier 
responses (i.e., opportunism), which again implies a prevention frame. Our empirical study, 
however, revealed that bonus provisions and /or gain-share schemes actually do much more 
than simply discouraging supplier opportunism, as AT’s notion of outcome-based contracts 
emphasising positive incentives (e.g. bonus payments) appear to suggest. By setting positive 
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expectations, they can indeed help to drive supplier proactivity and innovation and to improve 
relationships, provided that initial positive expectations are met.  
On a more speculative level, relational contracts (MacNeil, 1980) appear to be 
underpinned by a promotion frame given that they set expectations for collaboration, flexibility 
and adaptation and relationship continuity (e.g. Lusch and Brown, 1996; Collins, 1999), 
although relational contracting studies sidestep the role of framing.  Employing RFT and EVT 
can be useful for explicitly addressing the psychological impacts of relevant provisions of 
relational contracts on the counterparts’ expectations and responses. Overall, RFT and EVT can 
be seen as useful complements to conventional contracting theories (TCE and AT) that enhance 
our understanding of contract design and its effects on buyer-supplier relationships. 
Our study also informs RFT by stressing the effects of hybrid-framed contractual 
provisions and highlighting the role of several contingencies that determine the direction at 
which hybrid-framed contracts affect supplier expectations (see P1) and supplier responses (see 
P2). It seems worthwhile to further  investigate additional conditions upon which each of the 
two frames (promotion and prevention) will be the dominant one, and how that relates to the 
overarching purpose of the contract, thereby shedding additional light on the subtle interplay 
between contract framing and exchange hazards (Weber, 2017).  
The findings provide two key insights to managers of buying firms with respect to 
effective contract design. First, managers can differentiate their approach to contract framing 
based on the type of supplier relationship in focus: while prevention-framed contracts can be 
more effective in transactional supplier relations, promotion- and hybrid-framed contracts are 
conducive to the development of collaborative relations with strategic suppliers. Second, the 
design of effective promotion or hybrid-oriented contractual incentives requires attention to: a) 
setting up performance targets that strike a balance between aspiration and feasibility, and are 
also realistic in the medium and long run, b) introducing salient bonuses in connection with 
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these targets, c) designing incentive structures that appropriately balance rewards (bonus) and 
risks (penalties), and d) explicating any uncontrollable factors influencing performance to 
consider them in the calculation of bonus /malus payments.   
 
5.2 Limitations and future research  
Our study has the following limitations. First, although we have demonstrated that the framing 
of incentives influences supplier responses, our research design does not fully allow for 
disentangling framing effects from firm-level influences on such supplier responses. An 
embedded case design (investigating multiple supplier contracts within multiple buying firms) 
could provide a more detailed picture, albeit it is arguably challenging to identify firms that 
intentionally differentiate the framing of their contracts. Second, limiting our study to a specific 
industry created the possibility of producing context-specific insights while controlling for 
cross-industry variations (Voss et al., 2002) in factors that would affect supplier responses (e.g. 
use of industry-specific contractual frameworks). However, a larger-scale study across 
industries is required to test our findings and to increase external validity.  
The study presents several future research opportunities. The first involves more in-depth 
investigation of the relationship between the overarching purpose of the contract and contract 
framing, to find out what type of framing is most effective given a specific overall purpose. 
Specifically, an interesting question is whether the adoption of a promotion frame would result 
in even more effective transactional relationships as compared to employing a prevention 
frame. Another research avenue would be to relate contract framing to various contract 
functions (Schepker et al., 2014), studying in what way relevant provisions should be framed 
to support the intended contract function (Schilke and Lumineau, 2017). Future research could 
also explore the interaction between contract framing and suppliers’ risk attitudes (Kim et al., 
2007; Eisenhardt, 1989) in influencing behavioural and relational responses. Risk attitudes are 
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connected to the dispositional tendency of parties to view situations either from a promotion or 
a prevention perspective (Weber and Mayer, 2011), and hence are likely to influence supplier 
responses to framing. 
Our empirical study is nonetheless one of the few emphasising the role of contract 
framing and its impact on supplier behaviour. We are hopeful that our work will pave the way 
for further empirical research to develop a refined understanding of the effects of contract 
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Appendix A: List of interviewed managers across the cases 
 





1. Managing Director 
2. Operations Director 
3. BD Manager, Business Control and Development 
4. BD Manager, Business Control and Development 
5. Business Developer, Business Control & Development 
6. BD Manager, Business Control and Development  
7. Business Developer, Business Control & Development 
8. Business Developer, Business Control & Development 
9. BD Manager, Business Control and Development 
10. BD Manager, Business Control and Development 
11. Logistics Network Manager, Distribution Network 
12. BD Manager and Logistics Network Manager 
13. BD Manager and Business Developer 
14. Logistics Network Manager, Distribution Network 





1. Vice President, Global BD 
2. BD General Manager, Inbound transport 
3. BD General Manager, Outbound transport 
4. BD General Manager, Packaging  
5. Key Account Manager 1, BD 
6. Key Account Manager 2 , BD 
7. Key Account Manager 3, BD 
8. Internal Control Manager, BD 
9. Operations Manager, Distribution Planning & Control 
10. Operations Manager & Traffic Coordinator, Operations  
11. Legal Counsel, Legal  
12. Insurance Purchaser; Damage Prevention & Claims Handling Manager, Risk 
Management Division  
13. Financial & Control Manager, Finance 
14. Vice President, Purchasing 





1. Global Key Account Manager, BD 
2. Global Key Account Manager, BD 
3. Manager Air and Outsourcing, Global Accounts  
4. Manager Air and Outsourcing, Global Accounts  
5. Ocean Freight and Air Manager, Operations  
Buyer 
6. Global Supply Manager and Outbound Logistics Manager  
7. Global Supply Manager and Outbound Logistics manager   








Appendix B: The interview guide 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
• Organization information (industry, core business, products/services, annual turnover and market share, key 
customers/suppliers) 
• What is your position/role in relation to the company’s organizational structure? 
• What does your job entail? 
 
THE SUPPLY CHAIN AND SERVICE SCOPE 
• What is the structure/mapping of the customer’s supply chain? 
• What is the key material and information flows in the customer’s supply chain? 
• What is the scope of the provided logistics service(s)?  
• Can you briefly describe the services provided within the customer’s supply chain?  




• Can you briefly provide an overview of the customer/LSP relationship in focus?  
• Can you provide a brief account of the customer/LSP relationship history and evolution over time (if 
applicable)? 
• What are the main challenges you face regarding the management of the customer/LSP relationship? (e.g. 
critical events) 
• What is the role of the formal contract vis-à-vis collaboration and trust in managing the LSP-customer 
relationship? 
 
CONTRACT DESIGN (PERFORMANCE, INCENTIVES, RISK) 
• What do you perceive as key challenges in terms of designing a performance-based contract?  
• How is the service specified in the contract (service specifications)? 
• How is ‘customer value’ defined and measured, if at all?  
• How is performance defined in the LSP-customer contract in terms of KPIs and service level targets?  
• Are there any extra-contractual performance measures (e.g. operational KPIs)? 
• What is the design of the payment mechanism included in the customer/LSP contract and why? 
• What types of performance incentives are included? Bonus or penalties? Or both? 
• What is the organization’s attitude towards performance-related risks? What factors influence this attitude?  




• What do you perceive as key challenges in managing this contract? Any examples? 
• How are service performance and KPIs measured and managed? 
• What kinds of performance measurement and management systems are being used?    
• How is service performance reported?  
• How is financial risk allocated and managed in this contract?  
• To what extent are the designed performance incentives effective? In what sense? 
• What is their impact on the customer-LSP relationship? 
• Are there any unintended consequences of the designed performance incentives? 
• Are your expectations from this contract met? Why/why not?  
 
CLOSING QUESTIONS 
• Can you suggest any relevant documents to look at?  
• Access to contract /SLA? 
• Can you suggest other interviewees to talk to? 







Table 1. Definitions of key constructs and theory-informed expectations and behavioural and 
relational responses under different contract frame types (based on Weber and Mayer, 2011) 
 





The motivation offered in the 
contract to achieve certain 
targeted or desired performance.  
 
Penalties; performance targets as 











The hopes/anticipations regarding 
the exchange/ the relationship and 
the atmosphere within which this 
will take place. Both are shaped 
by perceptions triggered by the 
contract frame. 
 
Overall negative; expectations for 
impersonal, business-like 
behaviours, and impersonal, 
detached, transactional relationships 
Overall positive; expectations 
for behaviours that go beyond 
the letter of the contract, and 







The behaviours the supplier 













The behaviours the supplier 




Arm’s length, impersonal 
 
 








The ex-ante hopes/anticipations 
being confirmed/ disconfirmed 




Confirmation: reinforces the 
business-like, transactional 
character of the exchange;  
Disconfirmation: triggers high 






reinforces positive, close and 
cooperative relationships;  
Disconfirmation: undermines 
the relationship, leads to 
partner dissatisfaction and 
possibly termination 













Table 2. Overview of the case studies 
 
 Case A Case B Case C 
Supplier Supplier A: Fourth-party 
logistics provider specialising 
in the food retail market with 
expertise also in pharma and 
healthcare  
Supplier B: Logistics provider 
specialising mainly in the 
automotive industry with 
expertise also in aerospace and 
industrial sectors 
Supplier C: Logistics provider specialising 
in freight forwarding and air and ocean 
freight transport (expertise in FMCG, 
fashion and retail). 
  
No of employees  80 1,200 30,000 
Turnover  €90 million €1,069 million  €6,800 million 
 
Buyer  Buyer A: International food 
retailer operating also a chain 
of in-store restaurants. 
 
Buyer B: Manufacturer of 
automobiles and automotive 
engines  
Buyer C: Manufacturer of packaging 
solutions and industrial packaging 
production machines  
No of employees 30,000 21,500 23,540 





Supply & demand 
management, product 
purchasing,  ERP solution, 
business development & 
consulting, finance, logistics 
network management, 
inventory ownership & 
management 
 
Inbound & outbound 
transportation management, 
returnable packaging services, 
freight insurance services, quality 
control & maintenance services, 
and logistics consulting.  
Freight forwarding, shipment booking & 
coordination, customs clearance, invoice 
administration and cost control, carrier 




Transport delivery on time % 
Picking accuracy % 
Product damages %  
’Perfect orders’ (OTIF) %  
Product availability % (at 
stores and central warehouse) 
Supply chain cost reduction 
% (as compared to cost 
baseline from previous year) 
 
Packaging availability %;  
Packaging delivery precision %;  
Transport delivery precision %;  
No. of product damages/loss  
Annual logistics cost savings % in 
terms of efficient transport and 
returnable packaging solutions (as 
compared to cost baseline in 
previous year) 
Total freight cost reduction %  
Ocean freight cost reduction % 
Air freight cost reduction % 
Deliveries Accuracy % 
Accuracy of sailing list when using multiple 
carriers % 
CO2 emissions reduction % 
End customer satisfaction score > threshold 
Logistics cost reduction % (resulting from 







fee’ mechanism. Incentive fee 
(bonus) is linked to “95% 
product availability” and 
“supply chain cost reduction” 
(annual target) 
 
Bonus payment only if >90% 
of supply chain cost saving 
target achieved. Bonus 
increases substantially only if 
Supplier A achieves > 99% of 
cost saving target. No bonus 
payment for cost savings if 
product availability is below 
the 83% threshold. 
‘Cost-plus-management-fee’ 
mechanism for transport 
management services.  
Unit-price mechanism for 
packaging services (per package 
unit).  
 
Standard penalties for ‘non-
performance’ in relation to 
delivery delays, product damages 
and any direct losses for Buyer B 
e.g. 1 Basic Amount unit (as 
defined in local currency) per 
instance or 10 units per year.  
No bonus for performance 
achievement or improvement 
‘Unit-price-plus-incentive-fee’ mechanism. 
Bonus /malus payment calcuated based on 
overall score (weighted KPIs): 
Score 5: +3%  
Score 4: +1.5% 
Score 3: 0.0%;  
Score 2: -0.5%;  
Score 1: -1.0 % 
 
Gain-share model for ‘logistics cost 
reduction %’. Cost savings-sharing 
mechanism introduced: 
< 5% saving= 10% share for [Supplier C] 
5-20% saving= 25% share for[Supplier C] 





19 years  
 
30 years (terminated in 2014) 
 
13 years  
Length of period 
covered by study 
3 years (2011-2014) 3 years (2011-2014) 2 years (2012-2014) 
Payment 
mechanism in 
force prior to 
study period 
‘Cost-plus-management-fee’. 
No performance incentives, 
but joint intent to introduce 
gain-share to reflect Buyer 
A’s changing emphasis 
towards cost reduction 
Same payment mechanisms as 
above, no changes. 
‘Unit-price’ mechanism, no performance 
incentives included. The bonus /malus 
provision and the gain-share for logistics 




Table 3. Criteria employed to evaluate the quality of case studies 
 
Evaluation criteria Measures taken to meet criteria  
 
Internal validity  
 
• Drawing on different literatures (contracting and contract framing) and 
theoretical perspectives (RFT and EVT) to discuss cross-case findings 
• Using tables to facilitate within- and cross-case analyses of framing 
performance incentives and their effectiveness (Tables 2 and 4).  
 
Construct validity  • Access to formal contracts enabled analysing the content of performance 
incentives, which provided clear indications of how they were framed. 
• Conducting interviews with supplier managers from various functions to 
triangulate their views of the designed performance incentives and their 
effectiveness. 
• Triangulating interviewee accounts with documents (e.g. SLAs and contract 
payment mechanisms) in order to address retrospective rationalisation issues 
and elicit more detailed data on the framing of performance incentives. 
 
External validity  • Collecting rich data from multiple sources: interviews and formal contracts  
• Writing up detailed within-case descriptions and analyses so that readers 
could potentially transfer findings to other contexts. 
• Relating findings back to the key theoretical perspectives employed (RFT 
and EVT) and existing literature on contract framing to enable analytical 
generalisation and theory elaboration. 
 
Reliability  • Developing a database of the interviewed managers (see Appendix A). 
• Developing and using an interview guide across all cases (see Appendix B). 
• Developing and updating a database with all interview transcripts, field 
notes, analysis memos and coding schemes. 

















Table 4. The effects of framing performance incentives in the studied contracts 
 




Promotion frame: bonus for 
hitting product availability and 
supply chain cost reduction 
targets. Resulted from 
negotiations regarding which 
performance aspect to link 
incentive fee to, and whether to 
also include a penalty element 
(eventually rejected).  
 
Prevention frame: penalty 
clause for non-performance of 
services in terms of delays in 
product deliveries and loss or 
damage of products.  
‘Hybrid’ frame with promotion 
and prevention elements: penalty 
and bonus clause for service 
performance; gain-share 
mechanism for savings arising 







The gain-share scheme set 
positive expectations: for 
alignment with buyer’s 
interests, and for buyer-supplier 
cooperation.   
Joint aspirational goal to 
improve supply chain efficiency 
and to spur further business 
growth seen as important by 
Buyer A, who perceived 
Supplier A as its strategic 
partner. Supplier A’s 
excitement to grow further 




incentives set negative 
expectations: for an adversarial 
working atmosphere, and for 
Buyer B’s close monitoring of 
Supplier B’s behaviour and of 
service costing /pricing 
(transparency required). Despite 
Supplier B’s generic reluctance 
to accept penalty-based 
incentives in contractual 
relations with its customers, 
they had to accede to Buyer B’s 
request (bargaining power). 
Buyer B transactional view of 
Supplier B relationship which 
led to emphasis on supplier 
opportunism mitigation and 
close control of cost and prices.  
 
The ‘hybrid’ frame of incentives 
set Supplier C positive 
expectations for close 
collaboration with Buyer C to 
proactively improve 
performance and introduce 
service innovations.  
 Buyer C emphasised the 
creation of such an aspirational 
goal of proactive improvement 
and innovation, as Supplier C 
was seen as a strategic partner. 
This aspiration goal was 
complemented by ‘must-be-met’ 




Supplier A’s emphasis on 
achieving the supply chain cost 
reduction target in line with 
buyer’s interests. Cooperation 
and flexibility to achieve goals 
were emphasised by Supplier A. 
Supplier B lacked motivation to 
improve services given lack of 
related rewards. Supplier B 
vigilance and focus on 
mitigating financial risks in 
relation to the penalty 
payments. 
 
Supplier C change of mentality 
towards proactive performance 
improvement and creativity for 
service innovation. Alignment of 
Supplier’ Cs incentives with 




Joint effort to achieve cost 
reduction targets. Supplier A 
stressed trust and the 
importance of Buyer A’s 
cooperation and active 
involvement in implementing 
required supply chain changes.  
Supplier B frustration regarding 
buyer’s focus on close 
monitoring and cost control. 
Arm’s length relationship given 
Buyer B’s focus on close 
monitoring of Supplier B’s 
behaviour and a safeguarding 
atmosphere. 
  
Collaboration and improved 
buyer-supplier relationship 
overall, despite temporary harm 
to relationship in relation to 
incident of the penalty payment 






Supplier A’s positive ex ante 
expectations were overall met. 
However, the contract did not 
specify how the cost reduction 
targets would evolve over time. 
Supplier A concerns regarding 
intensity of cost reduction 
targets and the salience of bonus 
payment led to emphasis on 
securing a viable ‘fixed fee’ 
element regardless of incentive 
fee design. 
Supplier B’s expectations for an 
adversarial atmosphere were 
met and led to a deteriorating 
relationship. Contract 
eventually terminated.  
Supplier B contrasted 
relationship with Buyer B 
against another customer 
relationship whereby a gain-
share scheme instigated 
collaboration.  
In the main, Supplier C’s 
positive expectations were met; 
but they were also violated in 
specific instances: (a) Buyer C’s 
responsibilities to achieve the 
improvements, (b) attribution of 
Supplier C’s innovative ideas, 
and (c) request to pay penalty 
for under-performance. 
Relevant contractual provisions 
were revised and refined to re-
instate collaboration and fairness 
(as perceived by Supplier C).  
 
 
